Discrimination and Association by Wolanek, Caleb C.
Concordia Law Review 
Volume 2 Number 1 Article 5 
2017 
Discrimination and Association 
Caleb C. Wolanek 
Harvard Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csp.edu/clr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the First 
Amendment Commons 
CU Commons Citation 
Wolanek, Caleb C. (2017) "Discrimination and Association," Concordia Law Review: Vol. 2 : No. 1 , Article 
5. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.csp.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/5 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@CSP. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Concordia Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@CSP. For more 
information, please contact digitalcommons@csp.edu. 
DISCRIMINATION AND ASSOCIATION 
 
Caleb C. Wolanek* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2016, the United States Commission on Civil Rights 
issued a report entitled Peaceful Coexistence: Reconciling Nondiscrimination 
Principles with Civil Liberties. In that report, the Commission argued that the 
law permits—and justice requires—that decision-makers prioritize 
nondiscrimination over civil liberties like freedom of religion and freedom of 
association. For example, the report endorsed the view that religious liberty 
should be limited as much as possible to freedom of belief; conduct “should 
conform to law.”1 This is because religion is discriminatory and can be used 
as a front for discriminatory activities. 2  Nondiscrimination policies, in 
contrast, “are of preeminent importance.” 3  Religious exemptions should 
therefore be read as “narrowly as applicable law requires” and perhaps 
amended to further protect against discrimination.4  
The report, as one would expect, has encountered sharp criticism.5 
But what developments influenced the conclusions of the report? There are 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School; B.A. in Political Science, Auburn University. I 
first wrote this essay for Professor Paul Horwitz’s First Amendment course at Harvard Law 
School, and I am sincerely grateful for his keen insight on an earlier draft. I am also thankful 
for feedback from this journal’s editors. All remaining errors are, of course, my own.  
1  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING 
NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 25–27 (2016); cf. Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (adopting a strict distinction between conduct and 
belief). 
2  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING 
NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 20–21 (2016) (“[R]eligious 
doctrines accepted at one time later become viewed as discriminatory, with religions 
changing accordingly . . . . [W]ithout exemptions [from nondiscrimination laws], groups 
would not use the pretext of religious doctrines to discriminate.”). 
3 Id. at 25. 
4 Id. at 26. 
5 See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S5828 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2016) (statement of Sen. Sasse); 
Anugrah Kumar, Leith Anderson, Russell Moore, Other Faith Leaders Ask Obama to Reject 
Gov’t Report Saying Religious Freedom Is Code for Discrimination, CHRISTIAN POST (Oct. 
12, 2016), http://www.christianpost.com/news/leith-anderson-russell-moore-faith-leaders-
obama-report-religious-freedom-code-discrimination-170750/#IhuSAaK0ebs Tj4qE.99; 
Charles C. Haynes, The Deeply Troubling Federal Report Targeting Religious Freedom, 
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innumerable reasons that a government body might take such an extreme 
position. Nevertheless, we can begin to understand this decision by 
considering one of the report’s central sources: the opinion in Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez.6 This Essay will examine the United States Supreme 
Court’s discussions in Christian Legal Society as a foundation of the policies 
encapsulated in the report. 
In 2004, the Christian Legal Society (CLS) applied to become a 
“Recognized Student Organization” (RSO) at the University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law (Hastings).7 Hastings denied CLS’s application 
because, under CLS’s interpretation of its bylaws, individuals engaged in 
“unrepentant homosexual conduct” could not become members or officers.8 
According to Hastings, CLS’s bylaws violated the school’s 
Nondiscrimination Policy.9 Hastings’ interpretation of the Nondiscrimination 
Policy prohibited RSOs from denying membership or leadership roles to any 
Hastings student based on categories such as religion or sexual orientation.10 
CLS challenged this “all-comers policy,” but the district court upheld 
the policy both as a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction on a limited 
public forum, and as a valid restriction of expressive association.11 The Ninth 
Circuit, which only considered the case from a free speech perspective, 
affirmed the district court’s holding that the policy was a valid restriction on 
entry to a limited public forum.12  In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.13 CLS had argued that the Court 
should consider speech and association independently, 14  but Justice 
                                                 
WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-
faith/wp/2016/09/16/the-deeply-troubling-federal-report-highlighting-religious-freedom. 
6 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 9–13 (discussing the case). 
7 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 672 (2010). 
8 Id. at 672–73. 
9 Id. 
10 See David Masci, In Brief: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.pewforum.org/2010/04/06/in-brief-christian-legal-society-v-
martinez. 
11 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. C04-04484, 2006 WL 997217, at *10–24 (N.D. 
Cal. May 19, 2006). The district court also upheld the policy under United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968), and against free exercise and equal protection arguments. Id. at 17. 
Those arguments are irrelevant here. 
12 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2009) (mem.). 
13 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 661. To avoid confusion, I refer to the group as 
“CLS” and the case as “Christian Legal Society.” This Essay focuses on pages 678–683 of 
the majority opinion (plus the related portions of the dissent). 
14 Brief for Petitioner at 21–36, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) 
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Ginsburg’s majority held that the Court’s “limited-public-forum precedents 
suppl[ied] the appropriate framework for assessing both CLS’s speech and 
association rights.”15 The dissent, written by Justice Alito, seemingly agreed 
by applying free speech case law.16  
But as this Essay argues below in Part I, the reasons invoked by the 
majority for applying only free speech jurisprudence cannot bear the weight 
placed upon them. Instead, just beneath the surface of both opinions lurks a 
subversive conflict between freedom of association and nondiscrimination. 
Differing views on those issues divided the Justices. By understanding the 
Justices’ views—the subject of Part II—one discovers the majority opinion 
is somewhat better than Justice Alito thought, yet also more pernicious than 
he indicated. And as discussed in Part III, this in turn explains Christian Legal 
Society’s legacy, including the Peaceful Coexistence report. 
I. FREE SPEECH VS. FREE ASSOCIATION 
The Court gave three rationales for analyzing the case solely through 
free speech precedent instead of applying free association precedent.17 But 
these rationales are flawed—each ultimately descends into an analysis of the 
nature of expressive associations.  
A. The “Lowest Common Denominator” Rationale 
First, the Court said that “speech and expressive-association rights are 
closely linked,” and therefore “it would be anomalous for a restriction on 
speech to survive constitutional review under our limited-public-forum test 
only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive 
association.” 18  But taking this seriously would reduce the constitutional 
calculus to the lowest common denominator.19  Restrictions on speech in 
limited public forums must meet a threshold level of constitutionality (that is, 
they must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral), but this does not, or at least 
                                                 
(No. 08-1371). 
15 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 680. 
16 Id. at 706–41. 
17 Id. at 680. 
18 Id. at 680–81. 
19 See Chapin Cimino, Campus Citizenship and Associational Freedom: An Aristotelian 
Take on the Nondiscrimination Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 561 (2011). 
 
2017 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW 89 
should not, automatically eviscerate other constitutional rights, such as the 
freedom of association.  
In other words, it should be possible for a policy to survive under one 
clause and fail under another. This principle is shown elsewhere in 
constitutional law. For example, in Board of Airport Commissioners of Los 
Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,20 the airport’s ban on “First Amendment 
activities” was a neutral and generally applicable policy, and thus it would 
survive under post-Employment Division v. Smith Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence.21 Nevertheless, the airport’s policy was blatantly invalid on 
free speech grounds.22 Thus, before the Court can say that speech always 
trumps association, far more than a “lowest common denominator” argument 
is needed. 
B. The “Inapplicability” Rationale 
Second, the Court hinted that expressive association was not actually 
implicated. It wrote that because CLS was only being forced to choose 
between changing its membership policies and accepting “a state subsidy”—
instead of being punished for its position or being forced to accept an 
unwanted member—free speech doctrine was appropriate.23  
CLS is an expressive association—a fact the majority did not 
dispute.24 As CLS explained to the Court, each CLS chapter is part of “a 
nationwide association of lawyers, law students, law professors, and judges 
who share a common faith and seek to honor Jesus Christ in the legal 
profession.” 25  CLS chapters host Bible studies and provide “moral and 
spiritual guidance.”26 As the Court wrote in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:27 
“It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system 
                                                 
20 Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
21 See id. at 571 (explaining that the language in the statute applies the restrictions on 
speech to all individuals and entities). 
22 Id. at 574–77 (invalidating policy on overbreadth grounds); see also Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (holding that the government violated the free speech 
clause without violating the free exercise clause). 
23 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 682. 
24 Id. at 680. 
25 Brief in Opposition for Hastings Coll. of the Law Respondents at 5, Christian Legal 
Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (No. 08-1371). 
26 Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) 
(No. 08-1371). 
27 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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of values engages in expressive activity.” 28  Therefore, as an expressive 
association, CLS had an inherent interest in regulating membership. 
For this reason, the Court’s distinction between “regulations that 
compel[] a group to include unwanted members” and “policies . . . that 
withhold benefits” is one without a difference. 29  CLS refused to accept 
certain prospective members while Hastings wanted CLS to be open to all 
students. Even though there was no evidence CLS had turned away any 
students, Hastings wanted all students to be eligible for membership, and 
RSO status was the carrot (or stick) Hastings used against CLS in this 
struggle. In short, the all-comers policy was an “intrusion into the internal 
structure or affairs of an association.”30  
In supporting its distinction between “subsidy” and “punishment,” the 
Court cited Bob Jones University v. United States, 31  which allowed the 
government to condition tax-exempt status on eschewing race 
discrimination,32 and Grove City College v. Bell,33 which conditioned federal 
educational assistance on Title IX compliance.34 The Court’s analogy to these 
cases is clear: CLS could still meet on campus, but Hastings would not have 
to subsidize CLS’s meetings through the RSO program.  
However, this analogy has several weaknesses. First, securing official 
recognition as a student organization is critical; denying recognition 
substantially impedes a group’s success. Refusing to “subsidize” a student 
organization because of disfavored beliefs is far more detrimental than 
similar actions vis-à-vis a full-fledged university.35 The institutions in Bob 
Jones and Grove City would have continued to exist without the “subsidy”; 
they were not forced to choose between operating an educational institution 
and complying with nondiscrimination policies. In contrast, CLS’s continued 
                                                 
28  Id. at 650 (holding that instilling values “both expressly and by example” is an 
expressive activity). 
29 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 664–82. 
30 Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
623 (1984)). 
31 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
32 Id. at 603–04 (“Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the 
operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their 
religious tenets.”). 
33 Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
34 Id. at 575 (“Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to 
federal financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept.”). 
35 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 574; Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 555. 
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existence was quite possibly on the line, suggesting that the more apt analogy 
is banning universities that support race or sex discrimination.36 
Second, and more significantly, the subsidy–punishment distinction 
is entirely irrelevant here, and its application undermines the “neutrality” 
prong of the limited-public-forum analysis. The RSO program was analyzed 
as a limited public forum.37 Thus according to existing doctrine on limited 
public forums, Hastings should not have been able to withhold privileges 
from disfavored speakers any more than it could have imposed punishments 
on those same speakers. Hastings was exercising its gate-keeping authority 
in choosing who had access to the limited public forum. As a result, CLS 
should not have been seen as seeking funding but as seeking access.38 Bob 
Jones University and Grove City College would still be colleges without 
federal funds; CLS would not be a student organization without meeting 
Hastings’ demands.39 
                                                 
36 There was supposedly no malicious intent to kick CLS off campus. Christian Legal 
Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 706 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding a lack of intent to purposefully 
kick CLS off campus). The Ninth Circuit, on remand, held CLS waived any “pretext” 
argument. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010). 
37 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 682 (stating that “this case fits comfortably within 
the limited-public-forum category”).  
38 The majority disagreed with this assessment on a factual basis, writing that “Hastings 
offered CLS access to school facilities to conduct meetings and the use of chalkboards and 
generally available bulletin boards to advertise events.” Id. at 690. I find it hard to believe 
that the absence of these resources would have persuaded the Court to agree with Justice 
Alito. After all, Justice Alito pointed out evidence that CLS actually was not being given 
access to the campus because every time that CLS requested to meet on campus the 
administration offered no response. Id. at 716–17 (Alito, J., dissenting). And, the majority’s 
rationale allows withholding access even if there are no financial benefits to be had. 
Moreover, Professor Paulsen argues that “university officials cannot force . . . groups to 
abdicate their rights of expressive association as a condition of ‘equal access’ to a limited 
public forum for expression.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way 
to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious 
Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 682 (1996). That would constitute an 
“unconstitutional condition.” Id. But see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association 
and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1938–41 (2008) (rejecting this 
argument). Paulsen’s argument presumably does not consider that expressive association 
would be possible outside the forum. 
39 CLS’s ability to use some school facilities is a way to limit the opinion’s reach. Under 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the argument goes, organizations must be allowed to 
meet; under Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. 661, those groups need not receive funding. But 
construing the opinion as being about government subsidies ignores that the majority reached 
its conclusion under the limited-public-forum doctrine. Moreover, the fact that CLS was not 
completely silenced should be constitutionally irrelevant. See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 
U.S. at 717–18 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“We have never before taken the view that a little 
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Christian Legal Society is not a subsidy case, but rather a case about 
access to a limited public forum itself.40 Thus, the majority had to find a 
neutral criterion upon which to exclude CLS. 
C. The “Limited Nature” Rationale 
This brings us to the Court’s third rationale: applying strict scrutiny 
would “invalidate a defining characteristic of [the] limited public forum”—
its limited nature.41 This third rationale explains the majority’s choice of free 
speech over freedom of association.  
It is true that limited-public-forum doctrine allows for the exclusion 
of speakers who do not meet entry criteria.42 As Rosenberger explained, 
government actors can restrict access to a limited public forum in two ways: 
(1) they can limit it to “certain groups,” and (2) they can limit it “to the 
discussion of certain topics.”43 But government “may not exclude speech 
where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum,’ nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its 
viewpoint.”44 
                                                 
viewpoint discrimination is acceptable.”); see also Healy, 408 U.S. at 183 (quoting Bates v. 
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)) (“Freedom [is] protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental 
interference.”). 
40 In Rosenberger, the Court stated: 
When the University determines the content of the education it provides, 
it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to 
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or 
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message. . . . It does not 
follow, however, . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the 
University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it 
favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from 
private speakers.  
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833–34 (1995). Christian 
Legal Society denied that it called Rosenberger into question. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 
U.S. at 682 n.13. But the tension is evident to me. At the very least, it demonstrates that 
courts can hop back and forth between the doctrines to achieve the desired result. See Toni 
M. Massaro, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: Six Frames, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
569, 617–18 (2011) (discussing the difference that categorization makes). 
41 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 681. 
42 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–
93 (1993). 
43 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
44 Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 
(1985)). 
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The first permissible Rosenberger limitation, speaker identity, was 
not in question because CLS was composed of Hastings students. The Court 
hypothesized about a group of non-students seeking RSO status,45 but that 
was a poor example. A nonstudent “is not a member of the class of speakers 
for whose especial benefit the forum was created,”46 and it is fully consistent 
with the RSO program to only recognize student organizations.  
The second permissible Rosenberger limitation, the “purpose served 
by the forum,” is therefore the relevant inquiry in this case.47 The definition 
of this purpose is critical. As the Court has repeatedly implied, purpose is 
closely related to the “topic” of discussion for which the forum is created.48 
For example, in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District,49 the school district opened its classrooms after-hours for “social, 
civic and recreational meetings and entertainments.”50 Also, in Rosenberger, 
the student funding process supported “student news, information, opinion, 
entertainment, [and] academic communications media groups.”51 In this case, 
“Hastings encourage[d] students to form extracurricular associations that 
‘contribute[d] to the Hastings community and experience.’”52 The all-comers 
policy, therefore, must be reasonable in light of the “community and 
experience” purpose of the forum. 
There are two ways to construe this purpose. The first way is the 
“liberal individualist” or “egalitarian–inclusivist” approach. 53  Under this 
conception, the RSO program is a forum where individuals come 
unconstrained by group identity. This requires a fundamental norm of 
nondiscrimination because each individual must be treated as a single unit. 
The majority adopted this approach. Hastings considered 
“exclusionary membership policies” harmful because it wanted to “bring[] 
together individuals with diverse backgrounds” and thus “encourage[] 
                                                 
45 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 681. 
46 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. 
47 See id. 
48 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry Educ. Ass’n 
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 49 (1983). 
49 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
50 Id. at 386. 
51 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824. 
52 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010). 
53 I thank Professor Horwitz for this phrasing and for the “pluralist-exclusivist” phrasing 
that follows. See E-mail from Paul Horwitz, Gorden Rosen Professor of Law, University of 
Alabama, to author (Apr. 17, 2016, 12:20 EST) (on file with author). 
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tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students.”54 This implies that the 
program was essentially about homogenization. In this context, 
homogenization means that individual differences were isolated such that 
they became virtually invisible.55  By leveling out individual differences, 
Hastings “ensur[ed] that the leadership, education, and social opportunities 
afforded by registered student organizations [we]re available to all 
students.”56 
The second approach to defining the purpose of the RSO program is 
quite different from the majority’s. This is the “communitarian” or “pluralist–
exclusivist” approach, and it treats the RSO program as simply facilitating 
group meetings. 57  It is “communitarian” or “pluralist” because it fosters 
associations centered around group identities or certain traditions. Although 
certain norms can be required simply to ensure order and a place for the free 
exchange of ideas, a strict all-comers policy is an impermissible limit on 
admission to the forum. 
Justice Alito’s dissent adopted this view of the purpose of the RSO 
program. Instead of treating the RSO program as creating a homogenous 
space, the dissent saw the program as simply allowing groups to organize on 
campus.58 Thus, the all-comers policy was unreasonable because it imposed 
a condition—nondiscrimination—unrelated to the forum’s purpose of 
creating a place for student organizations to meet on campus. This is also why 
the dissent saw the all-comers policy as discriminatory against religion.59 
Certain communities were allowed to form and exclude members, 60  but 
exclusion based on religion or sexual orientation was forbidden. 61  This 
                                                 
54 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 689. 
55 An analogy is homogenized milk: it still has fat molecules, but they are broken into 
tiny globules so that they cannot be detected. Good Eats: Milk Made (Food Network 
television broadcast June 6, 2007). 
56 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 688. 
57 For instance, by making it easier for groups to reserve rooms or attend conferences. 
58 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 730 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 724. 
60 Id. at 711 (noting that in Hasting’s answer to CLS’s complaint, it admitted that 
“political, social, and cultural student organizations [could] select officers and members who 
are dedicated to a particular set of ideals or beliefs”). 
61 Id. at 670 (majority opinion) (contrasting the ability to select members based on 
political, social, or cultural beliefs with the Nondiscrimination Policy which disallowed 
discrimination based on religion or sexual orientation). 
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affected the ability of groups like CLS—or, as Justice Alito argued, only 
CLS—to enter the public forum.62 
In short, the choice between individualism and group identity is at the 
heart of this case. 
II. ASSESSING THE MAJORITY’S CHOICE 
There are several reasons to support the majority’s interpretation of 
the purpose of the RSO program. For one, individual students fund all RSOs 
through mandatory fees. 63  Even beyond the cost of lighting and air 
conditioning the meeting rooms, an officially recognized CLS could request 
that their fellow students pay for proselytizing. Obviously, refusing to allow 
students to become members of an organization that they help fund is difficult 
to countenance. For example, why should an atheist student have to support 
religious organizations, or why should a homosexual student have to fund a 
group that will not let him become a member because of that student’s sexual 
orientation? 
Moreover, there is a valid educational reason to support an all-comers 
policy: attorneys must learn to interact with every type of person.64 They 
must sometimes represent clients they dislike or even know are guilty of 
heinous crimes. From a pedagogical perspective, Hastings has an interest in 
training future lawyers to excel in a diverse environment—contrary to the 
dissent’s protests, this educational decision should receive at least some 
deference.65 
But the dissent’s view is also well supported. First, as Justice Alito 
pointed out, Hastings hosted dozens of RSOs.66 Several of these groups had 
conflicting missions.67 There were Republican and Democratic groups, pro-
                                                 
62 Id. at 724–27 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 688 (majority opinion). 
64 See id. at 704–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing the educational aspect of 
Hastings’ policy); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–33 (2003) (discussing the 
value of diversity in legal education). 
65  See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 112–20 (2013) 
(supporting deference to educational institutions); Massaro, supra note 40, at 625 (also 
supporting deference to educational institutions); see also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. 
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (“When judges are asked to review the substance of a 
genuinely academic decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional 
judgment.”). 
66 Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 709 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. 
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choice and pro-life groups, and many others.68 In this sense, Hastings had 
facilitated a debate—not just groups of individuals interested in certain 
topics. After all, the groups were not called “Students Interested in Politics” 
or the like. Republican students were required to contribute to the Hastings 
Democratic Caucus, and pro-life students helped fund the pro-choice 
organization.69 CLS would receive funds from students who did not support 
CLS’s mission, but CLS members would also have to contribute to other 
antithetical groups.70 
Second, Hastings’ student groups almost certainly do not imagine 
themselves as collections of lone individuals. These groups are student-
formed and student-led, often with little guidance from campus 
administration.71 What often unites them is not the subject of discussion but 
rather the viewpoint from which the organization engages that debate.72 This 
was also true of CLS: it was a group of law students organized around the 
Christian viewpoint—not simply a group of students interested in 
“spirituality” in a general sense. The majority even acknowledged this when 
it said there could possibly be an anti-takeover policy,73 demonstrating that 
CLS did possess some interest in maintaining group identity. 
Third, and most importantly, the majority’s focus on homogeneity is 
contrary to the core of expressive association: the “right to associate for the 
purpose of speaking.”74 Essential to expressive association is the group’s 
ability to select its members. As the Court wrote in Dale, “forced inclusion 
of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive 
association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the 
group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.” 75  Complete 
nondiscrimination is therefore antithetical to expressive association, at least 
where the grounds of discrimination are rooted in one of the organization’s 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 669 (majority opinion). 
70 Id. 
71 See id. at 669–70. 
72 Id. at 672 (explaining that CLS required members to sign a “Statement of Faith” and 
live within the group’s beliefs, including limiting sexual activity to a married man and 
woman). 
73 See id. at 693. 
74 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006); see 
also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
75 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
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core tenets. It would be bizarre to say that nullifying a core tenet of CLS’s 
beliefs did not affect its ability to advocate. Indeed, Dale supports a holding 
that complete nondiscrimination would infringe on CLS’s right to expressive 
association. In fact, a nondiscrimination norm could go so far as to 
completely prevent certain forms of expressive associations within a limited 
public forum.  
Therefore, when the majority evaluated this case under free speech 
doctrines, it did so because it had to exclude expressive association. The 
majority’s conception of the limited public forum as being about the 
homogenization of individuals required breaking down the discriminatory 
barriers formed by expressive associations. The Court was not required, as a 
doctrinal matter, to elevate speech over association. Instead, its conception of 
the purpose of the forum was contrary to the inherent spirit of expressive 
association. Thus, the majority deployed the “lowest common denominator” 
argument as a smokescreen to obscure the fact that the nondiscrimination 
requirement for entry to the public forum hindered expressive association.  
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CASES 
If the pivotal determination in this case was how to define the RSO 
program’s purpose, then Christian Legal Society is perhaps a narrow ruling. 
The forum’s purpose is always case-specific, and nothing in the majority 
opinion requires every school to adopt all-comers policies.76 Plus, CLS still 
had access to campus, unlike the students in Healy v. James77 who were 
barred.78 Perhaps this explains why neither the district court nor the Ninth 
Circuit thought that Christian Legal Society was important.79 
Still, Justice Alito’s concerns are well-founded—the majority opinion 
is potentially disastrous. 80  As this case demonstrates, it is increasingly 
                                                 
76 An Op-Ed by the President of the University of California hints that change is possible. 
See Janet Napolitano, It’s Time to Free Speech on Campus Again, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 2, 
2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/10/01/time-free-speech-campus-
again/v5jDCzjuv710M c92AhaAqL/story.html?event=event25 (“I prefer a campus that is 
loud to one that is quiet.”). 
77 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
78 Id. at 175. 
79 Neither the District Court of Northern California nor the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals published their opinions. 
80 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Disaster: The Worst Religious Freedom Case in Fifty 
Years, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 286 (2012); Jack Willems, The Loss of Freedom of 
Association in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010), 34 HARV. J.L. & 
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difficult to separate into identity groups and exclude those who disagree with 
that group’s mission. Today there is an ever-increasing belief that 
discrimination is always wrong. 81  Hastings’ creation of a limited public 
forum to foster a homogenous population demonstrates that belief. 
Discrimination is not inherently evil, however. At its amoral core, 
discrimination simply favors one thing over another.82 We discriminate based 
on cleanliness when choosing roommates and restaurants; based on 
promptness when choosing co-authors and dry cleaners; and based on 
pleasantness when choosing friends and hairdressers. When we form 
organizations, we do so based on shared beliefs—that global warming is a 
threat; that the unborn are human persons; that campaign finance laws need 
reform; or that the law is structured to oppress minorities. Because these 
shared convictions define the organization, they form the basis for the 
inclusion or exclusion of potential members. If all discrimination were 
forbidden, then groups could not form around individual subjects (such as 
climate change, abortion, campaign finance, or racism), because restricting 
the conversation to any one topic itself requires discriminating against all 
other topics.  
Hastings, then, could not honestly be comprehensively opposed to 
discrimination. Instead, Hastings was opposed to discrimination based on 
                                                 
PUB. POL’Y 805 (2011); William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for 
Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 261 EDUC. L. REP. 473 
(2010). 
81 See THE BLACK EYED PEAS, Where Is the Love?, on ELEPHUNK (Interscope Records 
2004) (stating that “to discriminate only generates hate”) (emphasis added); Leanne Barnes, 
There is Nothing Positive in Positive Discrimination, UKIP DAILY (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.ukipdaily.com/nothing-positive-positive-discrimination (“Discrimination . . . is 
terribly wrong.”). 
82 See, e.g., Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
discrimination as “[t]he intellectual faculty of noting differences and similarities”); 
Discrimination, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY: DESK EDITION 186 
(2012) (defining discrimination as “[p]erceiving or treating people, or things, differently 
from one another”); Discriminate, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 758 (2d ed. 1989) 
(defining discriminate as “[t]o make or constitute a difference in or between; to distinguish, 
differentiate”); Discriminate, THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 564 (2d ed. 1987) (defining discriminate as “to make or constitute a distinction”); 
Discriminate, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 648 (1981) (defining discriminate 
as “distinguish between or among”). 
To be sure, dictionaries also reflect that the word refers to wrongful discrimination. See, 
e.g., Discrimination, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 160 (6th ed. 2010) (defining 
discrimination as “the unequal treatment of parties who are similarly situated”). That imports 
moral judgment—that the parties are actually similarly situated—into the definition. 
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certain traits, like religion and sexual orientation. This requires an 
explanation of why those categories are unique.83 And we do think they are 
unique, at least in certain circumstances. The law almost instinctively 
distinguishes between discrimination based on religion or sexual orientation 
and discrimination based on tidiness or promptness.84 Perhaps the answer is 
that such discrimination targets an individual’s basic human identity.85 
But if this is a public forum case, how can we permit discrimination 
in regulating access to the forum, even if it is to prevent invidious 
discrimination against a would-be member’s core identity? To do so is 
inconsistent with the rest of free speech doctrine, which expressly forecloses 
viewpoint discrimination.86 Creating a “forum for nondiscrimination” simply 
lets viewpoint discrimination in through the back door, excluding certain 
groups based on the group’s identity and the strength with which it holds its 
views.87  In short, this approach exploits the baseline of “neutrality.” An 
analogy would be creating a limited public forum for the purpose of 
promoting “pro-government views” and then claiming “neutrality” when 
denying an anarchist the chance to speak.88 Limited public forums should 
                                                 
83 See Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in 
MATTERS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE & LEGAL RESPONSE 194, 197 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2012) (“It is not ‘discrimination’ that is wrong; instead, it is wrongful discrimination that is 
wrong.”). 
84 See, e.g., EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015) 
(regarding religious discrimination); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96 
(2013) (regarding sexual orientation discrimination). 
85 See Garnett, supra note 83, at 217; cf. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: 
Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 104 (2006) (rejecting a status/conduct 
distinction for both religion and sexuality, asking “What do they think being gay [or 
religious] means?” (emphasis added)). 
86 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) 
(citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)) (“It is axiomatic that the 
government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it 
conveys.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“[Government] has no such 
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow 
Marquis of Queensberry rules.”). 
87 See Garnett, supra note 83, at 200 (affirming that “‘discrimination’ on religious . . . 
grounds is a dimension of religious liberty that governments may, and sometimes must, 
accommodate”); id. at 219 (supporting CLS’s discrimination). Professor Inazu notes the 
tension between viewpoint discrimination and the government’s ability to make policy 
preferences, though he presumably applies the subsidization framework that I reject. John D. 
Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 
195 (2010). 
88 In a subsequent case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated the stark 
circularity here: “San Diego State’s nondiscrimination policy is reasonable in light of the 
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facilitate the free exchange of ideas, something a nondiscrimination norm 
prevents when it excludes certain expressive associations (which are entitled 
to free speech) from the dialogue. 
It is fear of this non-neutral “nondiscrimination” that grounds Justice 
Alito’s concerns. Justice Alito thought the all-comers policy was a tool for 
“suppressing the speech of [politically] unpopular groups,” just as he feared 
the nondiscrimination norm would creep into religious liberty cases, 
marginalizing religious groups under the guise of “neutrality.”89 We see these 
fears in the public accommodation cases that have recently come into popular 
focus,90 but the concerns reach beyond the present business context to all 
forms of association.91  
Arguments that discrimination based on religion and sexual 
orientation should never be allowed in public forums are well supported. 
However, there are also benefits in allowing such discrimination. Allowing 
individuals to coexist in spite of differences—not forcefully sweeping them 
away by government fiat—is a good thing. Instead, mandatory 
homogenization requires that certain views triumph over freedom of 
association. Just like political parties oppose and try to persuade each other, 
letting religious groups like CLS compete with groups that oppose 
discrimination based on sexual orientation would demonstrate commitment 
to free discourse and impassioned persuasion.92 Through co-existence and 
interaction, perhaps we can reach a greater understanding of each other.93 
But for now, the majority in Christian Legal Society stands in 
opposition to this overarching goal. If the Court wanted to uphold the all-
                                                 
student organization program’s purpose of promoting diversity and nondiscrimination.” 
Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 2011). 
89 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 707 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
90 See, e.g., Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 91615-2, 2017 WL 629181 
(Wash. Feb. 16, 2017); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Craig 
v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015). 
91 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 25 (using Christian Legal Society to 
support broad nondiscrimination policies despite religious objections). 
92 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (holding that “reprehensible” 
conduct is protected by the First Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) 
(holding that a state cannot criminalize the use of particular words). 
93  My thoughts here have been broadly influenced by JOHN INAZU, CONFIDENT 
PLURALISM (2016); John Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587 (2015). There 
is also a Millian tint to this point. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM, 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 19 (Mark Philp & Frederick Rosen eds., 2d ed. 2015) (defending free 
expression as a means of reaching the truth). 
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comers policy, it should have rejected the limited-public-forum analysis 
altogether and simply said that Hastings was engaged in state-sponsored 
speech.94 It is possible that the RSO program was government speech—an 
unorthodox form of legal education. But, the RSO program does not perfectly 
meet the requirements for government speech. It is often difficult to draw the 
line between government speech and limited public forums.95 Additionally, 
this approach risks the possibility that government might buy up disfavored 
speech by simply eliminating certain limited public forums.96 But the benefit 
of this approach—preserving the purity of limited public forums—is likely 
worth the cost, and political pressures will continue to preserve the existence 
of such forums.97 
Nevertheless, the Court characterized the program as a limited public 
forum, and its chosen approach of providing lesser scrutiny to invidious 
discrimination runs against our legal system’s deep commitment to the notion 
that government does not have a monopoly on ideas.98 Yes, this means that 
we must protect speech that we hate and is deeply offensive to some.99 But 
that is the commitment we have made.100 Indeed, the very idea of free speech 
                                                 
94 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 
(2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from 
determining the content of what it says.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
467 (2009) (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 
229 (2000)) (“A government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself.’”). 
95 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 470 (“There may be situations in which it is difficult 
to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for 
private speech.”). For example, compare Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (holding that specialty 
license plates were government speech) with id. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
specialty license plates were private speech). 
96 Cf. Agency Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013) 
(holding that the government cannot “compel[] as a condition of federal funding the 
affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the 
Government program”). 
97 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (articulating the nation’s 
“profound national commitment” to free speech.). 
98 See id. at 269 (stating that government is responsive to the “will of the people” and 
that “political and social changes desired by the people” come about with “unfettered 
exchange of ideas”). 
99 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (holding that “reprehensible” 
conduct is protected by the First Amendment). 
100 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (“As a Nation we have chosen a 
different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not 
stifle public debate.”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“That the air may at 
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is . . . not a sign of weakness but of strength.”); cf. 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of 
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requires protecting unpopular ideas;101 the majority needs no protection.102 
As a result, Christian Legal Society should have concluded along these lines: 
 
We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether 
[CLS’s] teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are 
right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an 
organization’s expression does not justify [Hastings’] effort to 
compel the organization to accept members where such 
acceptance would derogate from the organization’s expressive 
message. “While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct 
in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with 
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved 
message or discouraging a disfavored one, however 
enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”103 
 
By ruling the opposite way, the Court endangered free speech for all. In other 
words, it helped birth the Peaceful Coexistence report by the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights. 
                                                 
free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of 
relative social costs and benefits.”). 
101 See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (invalidating a statute that criminalized speech that 
was discriminatory on the basis of race, color, religion, creed, or gender). 
102 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[F]reedom to 
differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of 
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the 
existing order.”). 
103 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)). 
